By Gregory P. Kennedy
October 4, 1957, is often regarded as the beginning of the “space age” because that is the day the Soviet Union launched the world's first artificial satellite. Named Sputnik, the satellite circled the earth every 96 minutes in an elliptical orbit with a low point, or perigee, of 140 miles and a high point, or apogee, of 587 miles. Sputnik was a highly polished 22.8-inch diameter sphere with 4 whip antennae and weighed 184 pounds. Within the hermetically sealed ball, a radio transmitter broadcast a series of pulses or beeps every 0.3 seconds. When analyzed, the signals yielded data about the ionosphere and the temperature inside the satellite. Soviet scientists also obtained information about the density of the extreme upper atmosphere by observing the decay of Sputnik's orbit.
Sputnik caused consternation, dismay, and even fear in Washington political circles. Some American politicians saw sinister overtones in the Soviet achievement. After all, a rocket that could launch a satellite into orbit could also lob a nuclear bomb at America. How had the Soviets managed to launch a satellite? Who was responsible?
The genius behind the Soviet space program was Sergei Pavlovich Korolev. Born on December 30, 1906 (Julian, or old-style calendar; using the Gregorian calendar his birth date was January 12, 1907) in Zhitomir, Ukraine, Korolev was fascinated with airplanes as a boy. He grew up to be an aircraft designer at the famous Tupolev Design Bureau. He was particularly enthusiastic about gliders. In the early-1930s, he joined the Moscow-based Group for the Study of Reactive Motion, or GIRD, primarily to develop propulsion for his gliders.
Fredrikh Tsander founded the Moscow organization in late 1931. A similarly titled group also started in Leningrad at about the same time. To distinguish the groups, they became known as MosGIRD and LenGIRD, respectively. Korolev, who was still working for the Tupolev Design Bureau, soon became a rocket enthusiast and a devotee of Tsiolkovsky.
Soviet Armaments Minister Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy noted the work of the GIRD organizations and supported them. With official support, MosGIRD hired ten full time employees. By May 1932, Korolev was head of the group. He and Tsander had several projects in progress that led to the first Soviet liquid fuel rockets. Tsander's untimely death in 1933 from typhus was a major loss to the fledgling organization.
Under Korolev's leadership, MosGIRD built and launched the GIRD 09 on August 17, 1933, from Podmoskovia, near Moscow. GIRD 09 is best described as a "hybrid" rocket, since it burned a mixture of gelled gasoline and liquid oxygen. Mikhail Tikhonravov headed the technical team within MosGIRD that designed and built the rocket. Korolev used an engine developed by Tsander before his death to propel the GIRD-X on November 25, 1933. Burning liquid oxygen and ethyl alcohol, this was the first all-liquid fuel rocket in the Soviet Union.
Other groups of rocket and space travel enthusiasts popped up in the Soviet Union during the 1920s and 30s. The most significant was the Gas Dynamics Laboratory (GDL) in Leningrad. In 1928, 21-year old Valentin Glushko, who had previously attended Leningrad University before he joined the GDL, suggested they add liquid and electrical rocket subdivisions. Glushko became head of the effort. As a teenager, Glushko had read the works of Jules Verne, which inspired a life-long interest in space travel.
Osoaviakhim, an organization that supported various civilian enterprises that might be militarily useful, funded the GIRD early in its existence. (Osoaviakhim also funded Soviet stratospheric balloon flights.) Tukhachevskiy provided support to the GDL. In 1933, the GDL merged with MosGIRD to form the Jet Propulsion Scientific Research Institute (RNII), an entity supported by the Armaments Minister. A highly successful result of the creation of the RNII was the use of Glushko's ORM-65 engine in the RP-318 glider designed by Korolev.
The group continued to progress until the Spring of 1938, when Tukhachevskiy was arrested and executed during Stalin's purges. Those who worked for the former minister were also arrested, including Glushko and Korolev. Glushko, who was arrested in March, became one of Korolev’s accusers. One night in June, the dreaded knock on the door occurred, and Korolev was taken into custody. Korolev was initially sentenced to ten years at hard labor in Siberia, followed by five years of disenfranchisement and forfeiture of all personal property. He ended up in the dreaded Kolyma Gold Mines, which were particularly harsh even by GULag standards.
Korolev survived in the camp for about a year, when he was summoned and sent to a special prison near Moscow. Realizing that many of the unfortunates in the GULags had valuable skills, Stalin authorized special prisons called "sharashkas" where their talents could be used. Tupolev, who was himself under arrest, requested that Korolev be transferred to one of these as an aviation scientist. Glushko had been similarly imprisoned in a sharashka and allowed to work on rocket propulsion. During the war, as German troops advanced, Tupolev’s sharashka relocated to Omsk.
In the latter stages of World War II, the Soviets eagerly sought to capture as much materiel as they could from the German rocket program. With the collapse of the Third Reich, Soviet ground forces captured Peenemünde on May 3, 1945. They found the installation occupied by middle level managers and technicians. Von Braun and most of his senior staff had already fled west and surrendered to the Americans.
The most senior manager from Peenemünde who went to the Soviets was Helmut Grottrup, who was deputy to Dr. Ernst Steinhoff in the guidance and instruments laboratory. American forces also recovered the Peenemünde technical archives, which had been hidden in a mine. The underground factory where slave laborers built the V-2s was in an area slated to be turned over to the Soviets, but was first occupied by American forces. The Americans removed more than 300 boxcar loads of hardware from the factory. When told of how the Americans managed to secure the top rocket scientists, technical archives, and had first crack at the factory, Stalin was furious.
Korolev, who had been released from prison in 1944, was sent to the underground V-2 factory, Mittelwerke, near Nordhausen to restart the production line. He discovered the Americans had removed nearly all of the partially completed rockets on the assembly line. Although they only had components of missiles and little technical data to draw upon, the Soviets decided to replicate the V-2.
Korolev set up the Nordhausen Institute in nearby Bleicherode and began the task. Before being dispatched to Germany, Korolev was made a Colonel in the Red Army. Besides the V-2 factory, Soviet forces captured the German liquid oxygen plant and put it back into operation. Glushko was also sent to Germany to construct a test stand near Lehesten.
Soviet technical teams found blueprints and missile specifications in a German archive in Prague. Korolev asked Vasily P. Mishin to head the team that translated the German documentation into Russian. For two years, Korolev labored at the Nordhausen Institute, carefully piecing together V-2s. Korolev had a flyable rocket by 1947, so he closed the Nordhausen Institute and moved the production line to the Soviet Union.
Korolev rejoined Glushko, Tikhonravov, and many of his earlier associates at a newly designated design bureau, NII-88. Scientific Research Institute No. 88 (NII-88) had been created in August 1946, in Podlipki, which became known as Kaliningrad.
On April 14, 1947, a conference was held at the Kremlin to establish the direction of future Soviet missile programs. It was decided to concentrate on two or three designs. The Soviet produced V-2s were designated R-1. An improved version with nearly twice the range was called the R-2. Korolev proposed an R-3 that would have 10 times the range of the German V-2.
Three distinct organizations existed within NII-88. The first was an experimental plant; the second was a Special Design Bureau, or SKB; and the third was a group of laboratories that worked on such areas as aerodynamics, propulsion, guidance, and telemetry. Within the SKB, Korolev headed the division charged with developing ballistic missiles, SKB Number 3. In 1950, SKB Number 3 became Experimental Design Bureau (OKB) –1. Six years later, OKB-1 became independent of the NII-88 organization.
Soviet military officials established a State Central Testing Range at Kapustin Yar for missile testing. Located about 75 miles south of Volgograd, in the pre-Volga Steppes, conditions were quite primitive at first. When the first construction crews arrived, there was literally nothing there but a vast, empty wasteland.
Temperatures ranged from 40 degrees below zero in the winter to 100 above in the summer. During warm weather, spiders and vipers were constant hazards and clouds of gnats tormented people. Dust blew everywhere. Because there were no permanent facilities, Korolev and his people worked out of specially outfitted trains that had living quarters, kitchens, and laboratories. These trains came from Germany and had to be refitted with different gauge wheels when they crossed into Soviet territory.
Despite the hardships, morale remained high. Part of this was no doubt due to the belief that what they were doing was a matter of utmost importance to their country, but an even larger measure of credit must be given to the leadership style of Korolev. He was a stocky, powerfully built man with dark eyes that burned with intensity. Not one to suffer fools, Korolev could be harsh at times and was capable of towering rages and blistering rebukes. Yet, at the same time, he was quite caring for his subordinates and gave them wide latitude to express their opinions when they differed with his. When wrong, he was quick to apologize -- a trait that helped inspire a fierce loyalty among his workers.
A talented and insightful engineer with an intuitive ability to solve complex technical problems, Korolev was also a skilled administrator. He applied a systems engineering approach to missile development, managing the myriad of steps and processes that had to come together in the end. He created the "Council of Designers," which he informally called the "Magnificent Six." The other five members were Vladimir Barmin, Valentin Glushko, V. I. Kuznetsov, Nikolai Pilyugin and N. A. Ryazanski.
Korolev and the NII-88 team launched the first R-1 from Kapustin Yar on October 10, 1948. By lengthening the propellant tanks, improving the propellant turbopumps, adding a detachable warhead and other changes to the R-1, Korolev devised the R-2, with twice the range of the first missile. However, as tactical missiles suitable for widespread deployment, the R-1 and R-2 had many shortcomings. Their warhead carrying capacity was too small, their range was too short, and they burned liquid oxygen, which was extremely perishable, especially in a field situation. As it turned out, they made better carriers for instruments than explosives.
Like the Americans who launched V-2s from White Sands, Korolev placed instruments aboard some of the R-1s and R-2s. By adding a parachute, Korolev easily adapted the R-2 warhead into a recoverable payload section and used it to carry live payloads. In 1951, he flew two dogs aboard an R-2 and recovered them after they reached more than 60 miles. The dogs were named Dezik and Tsygen. After the flight, Tsygen became the pet of Anatoli A. Blagonaravov, who became Chairman of the USSR Academy of Sciences Commission for Space Research and Utilization.
In 1954, Soviet leaders gave Korolev authorization to develop an intercontinental missile. Korolev and his SKB team studied various configurations, finally settling on a “rocket packet” that used a cluster of identical rockets that could be jettisoned during the ascent as their propellants were used up. Mikhail Tikhonravov proposed such a plan as early as 1947, but it took Korolev to make it succeed. This was the seventh long-range rocket built by Korolev, so it became known as the R-7. No other rocket has achieved such an impressive list of space "firsts" or proven more versatile than Korolev's "Semyorka" (Seven).
Korolev had already mapped out the basic performance parameters of the R-7 ICBM by late 1953. He designed the ICBM to lob a 12,000-pound warhead 5,400 miles. Valentin Glushko developed two rocket engines that were incorporated into the rocket, the RD-107 and RD-108.
Korolev’s design had four tapered boosters around a central core. The RD-107 engine powered the boosters; the RD-108 was in the core. One interesting feature about the RD-107 and RD-108 was that they used four separate combustion chambers, but were regarded as single engines. To steer the rocket, Korolev added two vernier engines to each booster and four to the core, giving the R-7 a total of 32 combustion chambers.
Glushko resorted to the four-chamber arrangement when he encountered problems building a single chamber motor of sufficient size. One advantage of the RD-107 and RD-108 configuration was that it was not as long as a single chamber rocket with the same power would have been. Glushko used a single propellant pump for each of the 4-chamber assemblies. In addition, the central core had four smaller vernier engines; each strap-on booster had two. The verniers steered the rocket, and were developed by the Korolev bureau.
At launch, all 32 separate rocket chambers ignited simultaneously to generate a thrust of 877,300 pounds. The R-7, which bore the designation 8K71, burned liquid oxygen and kerosene. Korolev opted for a horizontal assembly and checkout of the rocket prior to launch. Compared to the first American ICBM, the Atlas, the R-7 was a very robust design. Atlas’ stainless steel skin was so thin that the rocket had to be pressurized, like a balloon, to keep from collapsing. The R-7, on the other hand, was strong enough that workers could walk on it while it was in a horizontal position!
The missile was assembled and tested in a large hall then transported on its side to the launch pad. Once there, it was raised to a vertical position. This way, the rocket did not have to remain exposed to the elements during assembly and check out. Four large arms supported the missile near the top of the strap-on boosters. Timing the removal of these arms was critical, for they held the rocket until the instant of liftoff.
The State Central Testing Range at Kapustin Yar was too small to observe such a rocket over its full flight, so a new launch site was needed. After surveying several possibilities, Soviet leaders selected a location in Kazakhastan, near the village of Tyuratam. To hide its true location from Western intelligence services, they referred to the facility as "Baikonur," which is about 230 miles away. The task of building this center was even more daunting than the one at Kapustin Yar, for the missiles launched there were much larger than previously handled ones.
Korolev was ready to test the R-7 by the spring of 1957. On May 15, the first R-7 lifted off from "Baikonur." A miscalculation in the design of the flame pit beneath the engines deflected the fiery exhaust upward, engulfing the missile. At first, observers gasped, fearing the rocket had caught fire, then saw it rise from the inferno. Steadily gaining speed, the R-7 climbed out of sight. The launch had been a success, but during ascent, one of the boosters malfunctioned and destroyed the vehicle. The problem was later ascribed to a broken fuel line that started a fire in the booster.
The next R-7 also failed, and another rocket was removed from the launch pad due to a continuing series of malfunctions. Korolev's critics openly questioned his design, and he found himself in a very difficult position. Despite the criticism, he remained convinced the R-7 design was sound. The next launch, on August 21, proved him right. The rocket reentered over Kamchatka, just as planned. With this success, the Communist Party Central Committee issued a resolution that Korolev launch an earth-orbiting satellite.
The R-7 received the NATO designation SS-6 Sapwood. As an intercontinental ballistic missile, it had many shortcomings. It could only reach the United States from launch sites above the Arctic Circle, and its electronics were particularly sensitive to moisture. As it turned out, the Soviets never deployed more than a dozen of the missiles. Despite its shortcomings as a weapon, it proved well suited as a space launch vehicle.
Both the United States and Soviet Union had announced plans to launch satellites during the International Geophysical Year. The Soviets published a description of their satellite, even listing its frequencies and how to pick up the signals. Most western observers did not take the Soviet announcement seriously, smug in their assumption that the Communists did not posses the technology for such a feat. When the 100th anniversary of Russian space pioneer Konstantine Tsiolkovsky's birth passed without a satellite the Soviet pronouncement was dismissed as merely hype and bombast.
Unknown to the West, Korolev labored day and night with the satellite project. Originally he wanted to launch a very heavy geophysical laboratory, but that phase of the project started to lag. One of his engineers, Mikhail Tikhonravov, suggested they build a much smaller payload, called PS-1, for Prosteishyi Sputnik. Korolev agreed, and the satellite was quickly built.
PS-1 was a smooth, highly polished, 22.8-inch diameter sphere with four 9-foot antennae and contained a battery powered radio transmitter. It was pressurized with nitrogen. Fans inside the sphere circulated the gas for thermal control. While small by today's standards, Sputnik’s 184-pound weight was much heavier than the announced American IGY satellite, Vanguard.
Korolev fretted over American progress; he wanted his Semyorka to propel the first artificial satellite into orbit. The launch was set for October 6, the same day as the announced presentation of a paper in honor of the IGY titled "Satellite in Orbit" in Washington, D. C. Korolev feared the Americans would launch a surprise satellite to coincide with the presentation. Despite assurances by the KGB that the Americans were not planning a launch, Korolev moved the launch date up two days just to make sure.
On October 4, Konstantine Gringauz climbed to the top of the gantry and checked the satellite in the R-7’s nose. Reaching inside the shroud that protected the sphere, he checked the transmitter one last time, then sealed the cover. He was the last person to touch Sputnik. The day proved very frustrating and there were numerous delays. Finally, a little past 10:00 PM Moscow time, the 32 chambers on the R-7 created their fiery spectacle across the Kazakh desert. As the rocket disappeared from sight, the launch team began to cheer. Korolev quickly silenced them, saying there should be no shouts or celebrations until they knew the probe was in orbit. Everyone quietly proceeded into the canteen and waited. Only an hour and a half later, when ground stations picked up the beeping radio signal, did cheers erupt. Sputnik was in orbit! Korolev had been first!
Sputnik broadcast a series of beeps or pulses every 0.3 seconds. Professional and amateur radio operators could receive the signal. By analyzing the signal, Soviet scientists learned about the ionosphere and the temperatures inside Sputnik. The density of the upper atmosphere could be deduced by observing the decay of Sputnik’s orbit. Powered by chemical batteries, Sputnik broadcast for 22 days.
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev reportedly took the news casually at first. He only appreciated the importance of the achievement when he saw reactions in the world's newspapers. Most of Korolev's senior staff took well-earned holidays immediately after the launch. Many of them had been working non-stop for the past eight years! Their vacations only lasted a few days, however, for Korolev summoned them back to Tyuratam before some could even unpack. Korolev met with Khrushchev after he’d had a chance to see what a major impact Sputnik had on the rest of the world. The Premier told Korolev to prepare another space spectacular in time for the next anniversary of the Communist Revolution. That gave Korolev less than a month to prepare and launch a second satellite.
When Korolev’s associates returned, he told them they would launch a dog aboard the next Sputnik. Using a hermetically sealed sphere like the one used for PS-1 for instruments and an animal capsule from one of the earlier rocket flights at Kapustin Yar, they assembled a satellite that could sustain a dog for a week. At first the task seemed impossible but, largely through Korolev’s force of character, exhortations, and tireless leadership, the satellite was ready in time. Sputnik 2 was assembled so quickly that no detailed blueprints were prepared -- only sketches.
On November 3, 1957, Laika became the first animal to orbit the Earth. Sputnik-2 weighed 1,120 pounds and circled the earth every 103 minutes. While Laika sailed overhead in a sealed cabin, scientists on the ground monitored her respiration, blood pressure, and temperature. Television images showed her moving around and eating from a special food dispenser. Laika made several rocket flights before going into orbit, but this would definitely be her last launch. Lacking the means to return her from space, Laika was launched on a one-way journey into space.
During orbital insertion, a section of insulation tore away from the capsule so it overheated. Temperatures inside Sputnik soared above 100 degrees Fahrenheit. This proved deadly for Laika and she died from the heat after only a few hours. At the time, the Soviets reported she had been painlessly put to sleep after a week in space. Sputnik 2 remained in orbit until April 14, 1958, when its orbit finally decayed and it burned up on reentry.
Gregory P. Kennedy© Gregory Kennedy 2007
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